The financing and taxation of U.S. direct investment abroad by Huizinga, H.P.
M Ei~~ Discussion
R `~Res~~, paper
" IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIYIIIUIIIIUIIIIIIIIIIIIII
,~ `CentER
for
Economic Research
~ ~!I4
No. 9324
The Financing and Taxation of U.S.
Direct Investment Abroad
by Harry Huizinga
May 1993
ISSN 0924-7815THE FINANCING AND TAXATION OF U.S.
DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD
Harry Huizinga'
Tilburg University
Revised April 1993
This paper was written for the Debt and International Finance Division of the World
Bank. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank.
I thank Lans Bovenberg, Antonio Estache and an anonymous referee for useful
comments.Abstract:
This paper examines the financing of U.S. direct investment abroad. A theoretical
moclel first examines home country investors can use debt finance to reduce their host
country tax liability and to reduce the capital investment distortion on account of foreign
taxes. Empirically, U.S. affiliates are shown to use leverage in high tax environments and
in cases where the affiliates face high foreign wage bills relative to assets. This confirms
the general notion that leverage can be used to ward off host country tax and wage
pressures on the firm.
The paper further examines what characteristics of foreign direct investment
determine the average host country tax rate paid. Generally, the taxation of foreign direct
investment is positively related to the ratio of plant and equipment expenditures to the
firm's assets, and negatively related to the relative siu of the wage bill. The latter
relationship suggests that host country tax authorities serve to offset claims labor lays on
foreign capital at the post-investment stage.1
1. Introduction
With the decline in net direct lending to developing countries in the 1980s, foreign
direct investment has gained in relative importance as a source of funds for investment in
developing countries. Foreign direct investment itself, however, consists of debt as well
as equity finance. This paper examines the joint determination of the affiliate's financing
and in particular its leverage decision and of the rate of foreign taxation on the affiliate.
A theoretical model first examines the relationship between leverage, physical capital
investment and taxation. The model is similar in spirit to work, pioneered by Jensen and
Meckling (1976), that examines the implications of agency costs, stemming from conflicts
between shareholders and managers, for the firm's financial structure. The firm is
assumed to decide on its level of indebtedness before the country determines the tax rate.
Leverage is then shown to moderate the level of taxation, as a highly leveraged firm
cannot pay high taxes without risking bankruptcy. The tax authority wishes to prevent
bankruptcy as it interrupts or stops the payment of tax. The model is an application to the
area of international taxation of the general notion that debt finance reduces the ability of
outside agents to capture the return to the firm's assets. The implication of the model that
leverage moderates tax payments is consistent with the internationally widespread income
tax deductibility of interest. The idea that the firm's fittancing affects the tax system is
opposite to that of Hodder and Senbet (1990) who examine the firm's optimal global
financing reacts to the pmvision of the international tax system.
The empirical research focuses on the determination of leverage and host country
taxation for the case of U.S. foreign direct investment abroad. The data is at most
disaggregated at the combined country and industry level. Debt finance is shown to be
relatively important for U.S. affiliates in developed countries. Consistent with the
theoretical moclel, leverage is positively related to the average tax rate. For the developed
countries Icverage is further positively related to the wage bill relative to assets in a
country-level regression. This suggests that firms can use leverage to lessen pressures
from tax authorities as well as from labor. For the developing countries, however,
leverage dces not appear to be related to the tax and wage variables. Apparendy for these
affiliates bankruptcy is not an effective device for firms to moderate tax and wage2
pressures.
The multinational firm's international leverage decision is related to its choices
regarding the extent and form of repatriated earnings. Earnings generally can be retained,
or repatriated in the fotm of dividends, interest, royalties, etc. U.S. multinationals'
earnings repatriation decisions have been a focus of previous empirical research. Kopits
(1972) offers an early study that estimates dividend payout equations for subsidiaries to
their U.S. parents using U.S. tax data aggregated at the country leveL Hines and Hubbard
(1990) and Altschuler and Newlon (1991) recently examined the impact of tax price
effects on repatriation behavior using micro data, which makes it possible to ezamine the
role of parent company characteristics in the determination of repatriation behavior.
A second empirical question the paper addresses is, what direct investment characte-
ristics affect the host country rate of taxation? In this regard, the paper examines two
measures of the average tax rate: (i) income and payroll taxes over assets and (ii) all taxes
on the foreign establishment over assets. For the developed countries, it is the first tax
rate that appears to reflect the characteristics of the foreign investment. In particular, the
average tax rate is positively related to the ratio of plant and equipment expenditure to
assets, and negatively to wages over assets. Apparently, the immobility of plant and
equipment makes it easier for the tax authority to tax these assets. The latter relationship
suggests that tax authorities to some extent undo the claims that organized labor lays on
the returns to an affiliate's capital. For the developing countries it is the second measure
of taxation, i.e. the ratio of all taxes to assets, that responds to the measures of the plant
and equipment and the wage bill. Finally, for developed and developing countries, alike
industry-effects are important. In particular, the petroleum industry is taxed the most rela-
tive to other industries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out [he theoretical
model of the relationship between leverage and foreign taxation. Section 3 discusses the
data and presents some regression results regarding leverage and taxation and Section 4
concludes.3
2. The Model
This section presents a model of the role of debt finance in determining the level of
host country taxation on foreign direct investments. The country is assumed to be unable
to announce a rate of taxation that will hold regardless of the firm leverage decision. Host
country taxation then will be responsive to fitm leverage. The model is consistent with,
and rationalizes the deductibility of interest expenses from taxable income in many
countries. The host country income tax, throughout, is assumed to be the effective
marginal tax on host country income. This is correct, if the multinational firm dces not
repatriate any earnings or if canno[ obtain double taxa[ion relief for host country taxes
from its home country, for instance, it is in an excess credit position.
The model considers a single home country firm engaged in foreign direct invest-
ment. Each period the direct investor decides on the quantity of a single factor of
production, denoted K, to be employed. K can generally be working capital, longer-tetm
capital or labor. In what follows, K is referred to as capital. The cost of capi[al, K, per
period is denoted r. Output per period is equal to f(K) f Z, where Z is a rattdom
profitability shock.' In particular, Z is a random variable on the interval L~Z~ with
density g(Z) and a corcesponding distribution function G(Z). The host country taxes the
firm's output at a rate r. The cost of hiring the factor K is not deductible from host
country laxable income, and hence the tax levied by the host country distorts the capital
investment. The firm carries debt which all matures in a single period. The total payment,
in units of output, due to creditors at the end of the period is denoted D. The host country
tax authority is assumed to be the senior creditor. Net-of-tax output is also always
assumed to be sufficient to pay for the cost of capital.
Generally, we will assume that there are costs of bankruptcy. The fitm's scrap value,
S, is, therefore, generally less than its no-bankruptcy value. The firm's value is the value
of all the debt and equiry claims on the firm's output, given the firm is presently not
bankrupt. Bankruptcy is assumed to occur if the combined present period claims of the
tax authority, the suppliers of capital, and the debt holders exceed the present value of
firm's scrap value, S, which will be fully realized one period after bankruptcy.Z Bank-
ruptcy, specitically, occurs if Z 5 Z, where the threshold Z is given implicitly by4
(I - r)(f(K) t L) - rK t S- D
1 ~r
(1)
The firm's debt is assumed to be held by many creditors. In principle at the end of
each period an individual creditor can decide to roll over the debt or to demand full
payment. If all creditors believe bankruptcy is determined according to (1) then it is
rational to demand full payment on the debt in bankruptcy states according to (1), and to
be willing to roll over the debt in non-bankruptcy states. The bankruptcy tule (1),
therefore, can be seen as a possible outcome in an environment where creditors do not
coordinate their actions. Of course with Z G Z, bankruptcy cannot occur. Given the
bankruptcy rule of (1), the per period probability of bankruptcy is given by G(Z).
The value of the firm, before the profitability shock Z is known, is given by the
expected net revenues this period plus the discounted value of the firm next period,
expected across bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy states. Formally, the value of the firm,
denoted V, is given by
V-Vt
V-G(Z)C
1 t r
where
V-(1 - r)(f(K) t EZ) - rK
C - V - S
(2)
and where EZ is the expected value of the productivity shock Z.
In (2), V is the expected value of per period net-of-[ax operating profits. C is the cost
of bankruptcy, given as the difference between the value of the firm in case of solvency
and the scrap value of the firm.
Equation (2) can be solved for the firm's value V as follows
V- r 1} rl V- C G(Z) (3)
L r J r
Let us now consider the objective of the host country's taxation authority. We will5
simply assume the country is interested in maximizing the present discounted value of its
tax receipts. The model thus sidesteps other possible govetnment objectives such as the
crcation of consumer surpluys, labor rents or of technological spillovers.' The size of tax
receipts in Ihe current periai are uncertain, as there is a random profitability shock Z.
The tax authority, however, is the firm's most senior creditor, and receives at least some
tax revenues this period. With bankruptcy the firm is liquidated so that tax payments
cease altogether. This is of course an extreme assumption. We could assume, instead, that
following bankruptcy the firm can be restructured after some time. In the latter case,
production as well as tax payments are halted only for some periods following bankrupt-
cy.
Let T be the host country's expected tax receipts per period if production takes place.
T is given by
T - r(f(K) t EZ) (4)
The expected discounted value of the country's present a~ future tax receipts is then
given by
T - I } r T
r t G(Z)
(S)
Before we focus on the firm's and tax authority's decision making in detail, it is
important to be clear about the exact order of events. We assume that, first, the firm sets
the value of its debt D due at the end of the current period. Second, the tax authority
selects the income tax rate r.` Third, the firm decides on how much capital K to employ.
Fourth, the firm and the country observe the profitability shock Z. Fifth, the debt holders
receive payments for their debts, and in the case of bankruptcy, foreclose on the fitm. As
is usual, we have to consider the outcomes of these decisions in a backward fashion. The
bankruptcy decision is of course immediate for Z 5 Z,with Z as in (1). What remains
is to consider the fititt's capital investment decision and the country's taxation decision in6
turn.
The Capiiul lnvesrment Decision
Al the investment stage, the firm's managers are assumed to be interested in
maximizing the return to shareholders, rather than the value of the fitm. The return to
shareholders consists of expected net operating profits this period after debt repayment, in
case of solvency, and the expected value of the firm next period. In particular, the firtn's
value to shareholders, V~, is given by
Z
V~ -~~(L - r)(f(K) t Z) - rK
Z
- D~g(Z)dZ t 1- G(Z) V
1 t r
(6)
Note, that as the profitability shock Z is additive, there is no conflict at the capital
investment stage between shareholders and debt holders.
The optimal investment level is given by the requirement that the net-of-tax return to
capital equals its oppor[unity cost as follows
(1 - r)f~(K) - r
Implicit in (7) is that investment K decreases with the tax rate r.
(~)
The Tax Selting Decisinn
The host country tax authority sets the tax rate r so as to maximize the discounted
stream of tax revenues T in (5). The tax authority takes the negative relationship between
the tax rate r and investment K implicit in (7) as given. The optimality condition is found
by differentiating (5) with respect to r as follows
dr - r~ G(Z)B(Z) d2 - 0
with
(8)
Z' - Z for Z 5 Z 5 Z-ZforZ G Z
-ZforZ 1 Z
such that
dZ' - f(K) t Z for Z 5 Z SZ
dT I - T -
- 0 otherwise
First, note that for the case where the tax setting dces not affect the probability of
bankruptcy, i.e. dZ'IdT - 0, equation (8) implies dTldT - 0 which means the tax
authority maximizes current tax revenues T. For the case where the tax rate dces affect
the probability of bankruptcy, we have dZ'JdT -(f(K) t Z)I(1 - T) 1 0. In this case
(8) implies that optimally dTldr 1 0, which implies the tax rate is optimally chosen to be
below the tax rate that maximizes current tax revenues.
The Leverage Decision
Finally, we have to examine the firm's borrowing decision. In particular, the firm
chooses the value of its debt D so as to maximize the value of the firm in (3). Differentia-
ting (3) with respect to D gives us the following optimality corxlition
1 t r dV dT C g(Z) dZ' t dZ' dT - ~ (9)
f r l dT dD - r [ dD dT dD
with
dV - -f(K) - EZ G 0
áT
and
dZ' -1forZ5 Z 5Z
dD -
- 0 otherwise8
and dZ'Idr as in (8).
The first term in (9) is the impact of leverage, via the tax rate, on cutrent after-tax
operating profits. The second tet~n retlects that leverage affects the probability of
bankruptcy directly and also through its effect on the taz rate r. Important in (9) is the
induced effect of leverage on the taz rate, i.e. drldD. The sign of drldD is generally
ambiguous. Specifically, for very low levels or high levels of debt, we have drldD - 0,
as in these cases the firm will go bankrupt with probabilities zero and one respectively. In
either case, the optimal tax rate from the tax authority's perspective will not be affected
by a small change in indebtedness, D, by the fitm.
What we wish to show, however, is that debt finance can always be used to lower the
host country tax rate below the no leverage tax rate. To see this, let T and K' be the tax
rate and capital investment, respectively, such that current tax revenues are maximized.
The tax rate imposed in the absence of debt finance is r'. Let D' be the highest level of
debt such that with r- r' and K- K' there is no probabiliry of bankruptcy. This means
that D' is given as follows
(1 - r')(f(K') t~- rK t S- D'
1 tr
(10)
Now let us consider a small increase in the firm's indebtedness beyond D'. This
increased indebtedness introduces the possibility of bankr~uptcy as now dZ'IdD - 1.
Also, we now have dZ'Idr 1 0. This means that from (8) the host country government
has to lower its tax rate below T. L.owering r below r has only a second order negative
impact on current tax revenues as dTldi - 0, but a first order effect in reducing the
probability of bankruptcy. As a result, the government optimally lowers its tax rate to
eliminate the probability of bankruptcy entirely. Increasing D slightly beyond D',
therefore, dces not introduce a probability of bankruptcy at all once the lower tax rate is
taken into account. From (7) we know that the lower tax rate causes an increase in
investment K. The net effect of this is, that with the lower tax rate and higher investment,
there is only a second order negative impact on tax revenues. In sum, leverage can be
used to lower the tax rate, increase investment and the value of the finm, with a negligible9
impact on tax revenues and no change in the probability of bankruptcy. This result dces
n~~t depend un the magnitude of the cost of bankruptcy. The argument goes through,
therefore, even if bankruptcy costs are very large.
The argument so far has heen that some debt financc can always be used to lower
host country income taxes on foreign direct investment regardless of the presence of
bankruptcy costs. Of course, the optimal level of debt finance generally dces depend on
the existence of bankruptcy costs. Specifically, the presence of high bankruptcy costs
should reduce the case for debt finance as a means of lowering the firm's tax liability.
This generally produces an optimal interior level of debt finance. Interestingly, however,
the optimal use of debt finance in the absence of bankruptcy costs is, also, generally
interior. Specifically, in the absence of bankruptcy costs leverage should be chosen so as
to render the probability of bankruptcy very senstive to the tax rate. The expected present
value of future tax revenues are then, also, very sensitive to the tax rate, and the
authorities face a large incentive to lower the tax rate.
The financing choice highlighted above is the use of debt finance. A separate, and
perhaps equally important aspect, is the national source of all types of financing. The
international ownership structure of a foreign affiliate affects the country's taxation
decision as the country, other things equal, is more interested in taxing foreign citizens
than its own citizens.s Knowing this, firms have an incentive to indigenize their operati-
ons by borrowing in the country of location as well as by selling equity shares to local
investors. Bradley (1977) mentions divestment to local investors as a strategy for
multinationals against expropriation. Host countries generally have an incentive to
facilitate this process as it forces foreign firms to divest partially. Regulation of this kind
is desirable if the foreign investors individually are too insignificant to influence the rate
of taxation of foreign investments. Ownership restrictions of [his variety allow a host
country to precommit to a low rate of taxation on foreign investment ex post. Such
restrictions potentially benefit all parties, as they can simultaneously increase host country
tax receipts, foreign capital investments and after-tax value of the home country's foreign
investments. Ownership restrictions are a policy prevalent in many countries.
Ownership restrictions alter the interaction between the affiliate and the parent, aslo
well as between the affiliate and the host country tax authority. The former aspect of
ownership restrictions is examined by Katrak (1983). In this regard, ownership restricti-
ons are undesirable if they induce the multinational firms to transfer profitable activities
back to the parent or to subsidiaries in other locations.
3. The Evidence
The Data
The U.S. Commerce Department collects data separately for majority-owned and
minority-owned U.S. affiliates abroad. Data collection for majority-owned affiliates tends
to be more detailed. Data is further collected separately for bank and non-bank affiliates.
Reflecting data availability and the interest of this study, all data in this paper are for
majority-owned non-bank U. S. affiliates abroad.
The U.S. Commerce Department has covered virtually all affiliates in its benchmazk
surveys of 1977, 1982 and 1989. The 1977 and 1982 survey data at this point are available
in final revised form, while the 1989 data are currently available only in preliminary
form. As a result, most of the information in this paper and in particular the regression
analysis is based on the 1982 benchmark survey. During non-survey years, the Depart-
ment collects less extensive infortnation from smaller samples of affiliates. The results of
these surveys are available in revised form up to 1988.
Table 1 first reports how the size of U.S. foreign direct investment, as measured by
assets, has changed during the 1980s. It shows that U.S. investment in the developed
countries more than doubled in assets from 1982 to 1989, which amounts to an increase in
real terms of around 58 per cent. U.S. direct investments in the developing countries
instead declined by around 6 per cent in real tetms.b This evidence shows that, at least
for U.S. foreign direct investment, there has been a trend towards relatively less
investment in the developing countries.
Table 2 provides information on trends regarding the tax and employee compensation
benefits host countries receive from U.S. foreign investment. The TIA and TII variable
are host country income plus payroll taxes over assets and over before-foreign-tax income
(and also before interest is deducted). Interestingly, for developed and developing11
countries alike, tax revenues as a percen[age of assets, as well as before-tax income, have
declined. In absolute terms, tax revenues have increased from ~17.3 billion in 1982 to
~20.2 billion in 1989 for the developed countries, while they have declined from ~12.7
billion to ~8.4 billion for the developing countries. The general decline in tax rates, and
in absolute tax revenues for the developing countries, suggests that tax competition to
attract foreign direct investment has become fiercer in the 1980s. The LJA variable
measures affiliate liabilities divided by assets. The table shows that this ratio has
increased somewhat from 0.63 to 0.65 for the developed countries, while it has declined
from 0.58 to 0.49 for the developing countries. In this respect investments in developed
and developing countries are thus becoming more dissimilar. P EXPIA stands for plant
and equipment expenditures divided by assets. Here the ratio has declined for the
developed countries, from 0.30 in 1982 to 0.23 in 1989, while it has increased from 0.19
to 0.23 for the developing countries. These trends suggest a general shift of plant and
equipment from developed countries to developing countries. The WIA variable stands for
total employee compensation divided by assets. This measure of host country compensati-
on has declined for developed and developing countries alike. The tax and wage data
together suggest host countries, and especially developing countries, are receiving
progressively fewer direct benefits from the presence of foreign direct investment.
Table 3 provides information on how U.S. foreign direct investment differed by
industry for 1982. First, payroll and income tax rates are highest in the petroleum
industry, followed by manufacturing and wholesale. Lowest taxes are paid by the finance
and service industries. The least leveraged industry is manufacturing, while the most
highly leveraged is finance. High-tax industries tend to have high plant and equipment
expenditures as a share of assets. Apparently, the presence of fixed capital assets enables
tax authorities to raise the average rate of taxation. High tax payments also appear to
ccexist with high employee compensation relative to assets. Apparently, the same factors
that allow tax authorities to extract tax payments allow labor to bargain for its compensa-
tion. Secondly, the last column provides information on research intensity, as measured
by the volume of research and development expenditure for the affiliate divided by
aftiliate assets.' Th~ manufacturing industry is shown to be the most research intensive.12
Of course, the infotmation, as presented in the table, dces not allow us to infer
precisely the relationships between financial structure and taxation. To address these
questions, we next present the results of regressions that attempt to explain the financial
structure choice of the U.S. multinational, on the one hand, and the country's taxation
decision on the other.
Regression Results
To start, Tables 4 and 5 examine the leverage decision for U.S. foreign affiliates. e
The regressions in Table 4 result from ordinary least squares. The country's taxation
decision, however, is argued in Section 2 to be endogenous to the firm's leverage
decision. To adjust for this, Table 5 reports two-stage-least-squares regression results,
where the P EXP~A variable is used as the instrument for the TIA variable. The data are
aggregated to the host country level. The dependent variable is the ratio of affiliate
liabilities to assets. Column 1 includes all countries in the sample, while columns 2 and 3
are for the developed and developing countries separately. The results in the two tables
are very similar. -
Overall it appears that higher average taxes induce U.S. firms to increase leverage, at
least for developed countries. This is consistent with the theoretical model, but also with
the simple rule of the deductibility of interest from taxable corporate income. The other
generally significant variable is the wage bill to assets ratio--WIA. Higher employee
compensation relative to assets is thus associated with higher leverage. An explanation is
that firms use leverage to reduce the firm's free cash flow which can be captured by
organized labor." The higher is employee compensation, the higher aze the firms'
incentives to use leverage to reduce labor's scope for increasing demands for compensati-
on. Note that in both Tables 4 and 5 the regressions appear to explain leverage fairly well
for the developed countries but not so well for the developing countries.
Regression results regarding the firm's leverage decision with data disaggregated at
[he country and industry level are reported in Table 6. The industry dummies I2 through
I6 are included to ezamine fixed industry effects. The base industry is the petroleum13
industry. The host country tax and wage pressure variables are significant as before, at
least for the developed countries. Plant and equipment, proxied by the P EXPIA variable,
is associated with less debt and thus more equity finance.'o The IS and I6 dummies are
signitïcant for the developed countries, meaning that the services and other industries
categories use less leverage.
Next we turn to the results of regressions explaining the host country's taxation
decision. The regressions reported in Table 7 again are for data aggregated at the host
country. The dependent variable is the ratio of income and payroll taxes to assets. The
advantage of deflating tax revenues by assets rather than income is that it sidesteps issues
of defining income. Deflating tax revenues by assets is, also, consistent with the defmiti-
ons of the right-hand-side variables in the regressions. The theory suggests the LJA
variable is not a truly exogenous variable, and the variable is left out. The P EXPIA
variable enters significantly throughout, while the WIA variable is negative and signifi-
cant for the group of developed countries only. The generally better fit for the developed
countries suggests that at least payroll and income taxes reflect foreign direct investment
characteristics foremos[ in the developed countries.
As an alternative to the income and payroll tax measure, we can define the average
tax rate, as all host country taxes on the U.S. foreign establishment divided by assets.
This measure of taxation possibly reflects sales taxes, export taxes and tax-like user fees
as well income and payroll taxes. Table 8 presents regressions of this altetnative average
tax rate using country data. Interestingly, the all-inclusive tax rate regression dces well
only for the group of developing countries. It appears, therefore, that the developing
countries use non-income and payroll taxes to establish the desit~ed effective rate of tax on
foreign direct investment. The relative responsiveness of non-income and payroll taxes in
developing countries to foreign direct investment cannot be a consequence of their overall
heavier use in [he developing countries, as the average non-income and payroll tax in
developing countries is around 6 per cent in the developing countries, while it is I1 per
cent in the developed countries.14
4. Conclusion
This paper has ezamined the financing of U.S. direct investment abroad. The
financing decision has been examitted in conjunction with the host country's problem of
taxing the foreign direct investment. Host country taxation and wage pressure variables
are shown to be important for the determination of affiliate leverage otily for the
developed countries. U.S. direct investment in developing countries is generally more
equity-financed than investment in the developed countries. In the case of developing
countries, the threat of bankruptcy may therefore be small, and debt finance cannot be
effectively used by the fitm to lower tax and wage pressures. A reason for the relatively
unimportant debt finattce in developing countries can be the lower level of developmen[ of
internal credit markets."
Average payroll and income rates of taxation differ widely across industries, with the
petroleum industry being taxed the highest, followed by manufacturing and wholesale.
The petroleum industry also pays the highest non-income and payroll tax taxes.1z The
finance and services industries, on the other hand, face lower tax rates. Consistent with
these stylized facts, the ratio of plant and equipment expenditures to assets positively
affects the average rate of taxation. At the same time, host countries appear to charge
lower taxes in cases where U.S. direct investors abroad pay high wage bills to labor
within the host country. In developing countries, non-income and payroll taxes appear to
respond relatively strongly to the qualitative nature of U.S. direct investment abroad.
Two main trends emerge fmm the data. First, there is a relative shift of U.S. direct
investment abroad towards the developed countries. Second, debt finance of direct
investment is becoming more important in developed countries and less important in
developing countries. More importantly, the tax benefits that developed and developing
countries obtain from U.S. affiliates, as measured by average income and payroll tax
rates, are waning. Average tax rates on U.S. investments in developing countries dropped
discretely in 1986 at the time of the U.S. Tax Reform Act. The decline in the developed
coun[ries, however, has been more gradual. The downward [rend in tax rates suggests
that there is increased international tax competition to attract foreign direct investment.
Income and payroll tax revenues that developing countries derive from U.S. investmentIs
have been also declining in absolute terms. The wage bill relative to assets that U.S.
firms abroad have been paying has also been declining. Of course, tax and wage benefits
are not all that multinationals can contribute to a host country. Also of importance are the
introduction of new products and the transfers of new technologies. The relative shift of
plant and equipment expenditures from developed to developing countries suggests that
the transfer of production technologies to the developing countries is on the increase.
The reduction in average tax rates on U.S. investment abmad and the relative shift
towards investment in the developed countries suggests a relatively tougher climate for
developing countries that wish to attract foreign direct investment. In order to successfully
attract foreign investments, developing countries can develop various strategies.
The theoretical analysis suggests that more plentiful borrowings by the multinational
allow the multinational to reduce the effective rate of taxation on foreign direct invest-
ment. One approach, therefore, is to deepen the domestic financial market to enable a
multinational to attract additional lending capital in the host country itself. In this regard
the existence of financial inten~nediaries that can channel local savings to international
companies and a legal framework that protects the rights of lenders are important.
Along similar lines, local equity participation in foreign direct investment should
lessen the incentives for host countries to tax foreign investments highly ex post. Indigeni-
7ation of the ownership of foreign affiliates can be encouraged by way of regulation, as is
done in many countries that have restrictions on the foreign ownership of domestic t"irms
or affiliates. In this regard, ownership restrictions may have a useful role to play in
environments where countries cannot commit to the effective rates of taxation on future
foreign direct investment. Ownership restrictions are a trade-related investment measure
that is subject to negotiation in the current GATT round. In these negotiations, the United
States has generally advocated the proscription of this and other trade-related investment
restrictions. "An empirical investigation of the relevance of international ownership
patterns in the determination of the rate of taxation on international investments would be
an interesting research step to consider. Unfortunately, published data on the international
ownership of foreign investments by U.S. parents is only available at a highly aggregated
level, which makes a careful examination of this link rather difficult.16
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Appendix
Variable Definitions
A - total affiliate assets
Dev dummy variable, equal to l for a developed country and 0 otherwise
I - affiliate income, computed as the sum of net income inclusive of foreign
income taxes, plus the U.S. prime rate times subsidiary liabilities
12 - dummy variable, equal to 1 for the manufacturing industry and 0 otherwise
13 - dummy variable, equal to 1 for the wholesale industry and 0 otherwise
I4 - dummy variable, equal to 1 for the industry of finance (except banking),
insurance and real estate and 0 otherwise
IS - dummy variable, equal to 1 for the services industry and 0 otherwise
I6 - dummy variable, equal to 1 for the category of other industries and 0 otherwi-
se. These are industries other than the petroleum industries and industries
denoted by the variables I2 - I5.
L - total affiliate liabilities
P Exp - plant and equipment expenditures by affiliate
R - expenditure for research and development performed for affiliate
by parent
T - foreign income taxes of affiliate
W - employee compensation of affiliate
Data Sources:
United States Direct Investment Abroad: 1982 Benchmark Survey Data, 1985.
United States Direct Investment Abroad: Operations of United States Parent Companies
and their Foreign Affiliates:
Revised 1983 Estimates
Revised 1984 Fstimates
Revised 1985 Fstimates
Revised 1986 Fstimates
Revised 1987 Estimates
Revised 1988 Estimates18
United States Direct Investment Abroad: 1989 Benchmark Survey, Preliminary Results,
1991.
AII of the above publications are pubtished by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Washington, D.C. Finally, data on U.S. prime interest rates were taken from the
International Financial Statistics of the [nternational Monetary Fund.19
TABLE 1. ASSETS OF U.S. AFFILIATES ABROAD (U.S. á BILLIONS).
Develoced Develonine
Countries Countries
1982 144.3 179.7
1983 144.3 187.6
1984 147.6 199.5
1985 166.5 200.4
1986 194.5 197.6
1987 242.5 206.7
1988 258.5 202.6
1989 293.2 218.0
See the Appendix for data sources.20
TABLE 2. A COMPARISON OF U.S. DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
Developed Countries
TIA Tll LIA P EXPIA WIA
1982 0.04 0.26 0.63 0.30 0.18
1983 0.05 0.28 0.62 0.29 0.17
1984 0.05 0.28 0.62 0.28 0.22
1985 0.05 0.28 0.63 0.27 0.15
1986 0.05 0.26 0.63 0.26 0.15
1987 0.03 0.22 0.62 0.24 0.14
1988 0.03 0.19 0.65 0.24 0.14
1989 0.02 0.15 0.65 0.23 0.13
Developin~ Countries
TIA TII LA P EXPIA WIA
1982 0.07 0.32 0.58 0.19 0.16
1983 0.06 0.39 0.44 0.22 0.14
1984 0.07 0.34 0.55 0.21 O.17
1985 0.06 0.35 0.54 0.21 0.12
1986 0.03 0.25 0.51 0.21 0.13
1987 0.04 0.26 0.50 0.20 0.12
1988 0.04 0.24 0.49 0.20 0.12
1989 0.04 0.22 0.49 0.23 0.12
See the Appendix for variable definitions and data sources.ál ~ s ~ s". ~ "s, s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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TABLE 4. LEVERAGE REGRESSIONS BY COUNTRY: OLS.
All Countries Develo Develooine
Countries Countries
(3)
0.439 0.331 0.475
(0.056)" (.065)" (.083)"
TIA 0.463 1.649' 0.380
(.316) (.708) (.422)
P EXPIA 0.139 0.418 -0.088
(.435) (.731) (.617)
W!A 1.017 1.360 1.109
(.387)" (.446)~`~ (.770)
R!n
DEV
-8.225 -7.946 -18.879
(6.913) (5.256) (29.201)
0.031
(.051)
R2 0.26 0.63 0.17
N43 22 21
Note: The dependent variable is the ratio of liabilities to assets. Standard errors are given
in parentheses. ' and ik denote significance at the 5 and 1 pere,ent levels respecti-
vely. See Appendix for variable definitions and the data source.23
TABLE 5. LEV)?RAGE REGRESSIONS BY COUNTRY: 2SLS.
All Countries Developed Develonine
Countries Countries
C
TIA
WIA
R~A
(3)
0.423 0.355 0.457
(.067)" (.078)" (.086)
0.666 2.055 0.404
(.422) (.710)" (.512)
0.901 1.450 0.738
(.290)" (.380)" (.385)
-6.437 - 10.138 0.671
(6.637) (4.778)' (22.058)
DEV 0.068
(.055)
RZ 0.22 0.47 0.18
N 47 23 24
Notes as for Table 5.24
TABLE 6. LEVERAGE REGRESSIONS BY COUNTRY AND INDUSTRY:
OLS.
All Countries Develoced DeveloDine
ou ' s Countries
(3)
0.589 0.573 0.578
(.072)'} (.063)" (.136)
TIA 0.423 1.738 0.281
(.333) (.572)'} (.473)
P EXPIA -0.085 -0.777' 0.077
(.277) (.395) (.404)
WIA 0.420 0.831" 0.086
(.195)~ (.202) (.375)
R~A -0.004 ~.296 2.009
(2.801) (4.305) (4.625)
DEV -0.004
(.039)
I2
I3
14
IS
I6
RZ
-0.114 -0.168 -0.012
(.083) (.095) (.151)
-0.049 -0.082 -0.037
(.076) (.072) (.146)
0.024 0.056 (0.013)
(.076) (.073) (.148)
-0.057 -0.212 0.031
(.085) (.092)' (.150)
-0.113 -0.260 0.061
(.100) (.091)s' (.201)
0.06 0.34 0.03
N 147 75 72
Notes as for Table 5.25
TABLE 7. TAX RATE REGRESSIONS BY COUNTRY: OLS.
All countries vel Developine
Countries o ntries
(1) (2) (3)
C 0.032 0.029 0.033
(.028) (.020) (.047)
P EXPIA 0.826 0.761 0.892
(.179) (.165)" (.289)"
WIA -0.431 -0.386 -0.460
(.186) (.117)" (.427)
R~A 3.429 3.016 3.919
(3.51) (1.599) (16.727)
DEV -0.002
(.026)
RZ 0.40 0.59 0.35
N 43 22 21
Note: The dependent variable is the ratio of foreign income and payroll taxes to assets.
' and " denote significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. See the
Appendix for variable definitions and for the data source.26
TABLE 8. INCLUSIVE TAX RATE REGRESSIONS BY COUNTRY: OLS.
All Countries Develo v lo
Countries Countries
(1) (2) (3)
C 0.049 0.068 0.071
(.045) (.091) (.043)
P EXPIA 1.034 0.979 1.168
(.286)" (1.332) (.265)"
WIA -0.046 0.325 -0.823
(.298) (0.524) (.392)'
R~A 3.953 -1.035 39.569
(5.620) (7.139) (15.348)'
DEV 0.048
(.042)
R' - 0.29 0.15 0.56
N 43 22 21
Note: The dependent variable is the ratio of all foreign taxes to assets. ' and '~` denote
significance of the 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. See the Appendix for
variable definitions.ENDNOTES
1. The function f(K) is concave with properties f' ~ 0, f" c 0, f'(0) - oo, f'(oo) -
0.
2. In equation (l), the scrap value S is discounted, as this scrap value is realized after a
period.
3. ln the present model, maximizing the present value of tax revenues is consistent with
maximizing the present value of national income.
4. If the order of these first two events is reversed, then leverage no longer influences
the firm's tax liability. In fact, in this case the tax authorities' objective collapses to a
problem of static revenue maximization, and there will be no debt finance.
5. This is the case, as domestic taxation other than through incentive effects dces not add
to national income.
6. The developed countries are Canada, Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and
South Africa.
7. Eaton and Gersowitz (1984) indicate that knowledge and management services
provided to the affiliate by the parent affect the country's taxation or expropriation
decision.
8. The regression for the developing countries dces not change materially if the average
tax rate is computed as all host country taxes on the firm divided by assets.
9. Of course, there are other possible explanations of a positive correlation between the
wage bill and leverage. ror ituia~~, a f:rnt that increases the rate of capacity utilization
may simultaneously pay more in wages and borrow more to finance additional non-labor
production inputs.
10. A potential explanation is that the risk taking incentive problems associated with debt
finance are less easily monitored for firms with much plant and equipment.
11. Also, the rates of inflation and indexation provisions that affect the tax advantages of
debt finance differ across groups of countries.
12. The petroleum industry pays on average 31 per cent of assets in non-income and
payroll taxes per year in the petroleum producing countries. The average non-income and
payroll tax is around 9 per cent of assets per year.
13. See Graham and Krugman (1990).Dlscusslon Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg Uoiversity, Tbe Netherlands:
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